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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commission's denial of an
injured employees' claim for permanent total disability and other workers compensation benefits. The
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 782a-3 (2) (a) (1953, as amended), Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-801 (8) (1997) and Rule 14 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Are the Respondents estopped from denying legal and medical causation and thus
the compensability of Petitioner's industrial injury by reason of their entering into a formal, written
Compensation Agreement, which was approved by the Utah Labor Commission?
Issue 2: Did the Petitioner establish legal and medical causation under the Allen test?
Issue 3: Does Petitioner have a compensable claim for occupational disease?
Standard: The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the resolution of all of
the above issues is "correction of error" since they involve questions of law and no deference to the
agency's view of the law is required, because the appellate court has the power and duty to say what
the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Drake v. Industrial
Commission. 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code
Annotated, § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review. 817P.2d 328 (Utah
1991). Morton International. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d
581 (Utah 1991).
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah Workers
Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt
as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner. E.g., State Tax Commission v.
1

Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); and McPhie v. Industrial Commission.
567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977).
Preservation for appeal. All of the above issues were raised by Petitioner before the Utah
Labor Commission. A Petition for Review was timely filed with this Court.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-413( 1997)1, is the applicable permanent total disability statute.
The statute in relevant part provides as follows:
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee has the
burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as
a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease that givesriseto the permanent total
disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the
employee's permanent total disability.
(c) Tofindan employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude
that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the
employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments
prevent the employeefromperforming the essential functions of the work activities for which
the employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational
disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonable available, taking into
consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and
residual functional capacity.

*At the time of Mr. Hone's work related injury, the Workers' Compensation statutory provisions for
permanent total disability compensation were codified as §35-1-67. Shortly thereafter, §35-1-67 was
renumbered as §34A-2-413, without any substantive changes. For ease of reference, the parties have
referred to the Act as it is currently numbered.
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R612-1-10 of the Utah Administrative Code is the applicable Rule which deals with the
procedure handling permanent total disability claims before the Utah Labor Commission. The Statute
and Rule are attached in full in Addendum "A".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: The Petitioner Daniel L. Hone seeks review of the Utah Labor
Commission's denial ofhis claim for permanent, total disability benefitsfromhis work related injuries.
Course of Proceedings: Mr. Hone filed an Application for Permanent Total Disability
benefits sustained as the result of an industrial injury on August 29, 1995. (Rl at 1-21). The
Employer and its workers compensation Carrierfiledan Answer to the Application on December 13,
2000. (Rl at 24-29). Notice of Formal Hearing was sent to all parties on March 27, 2001 setting
Mr. Hone's claim for Hearing on June 12, 2001. (Rl at 43).
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Application for Hearing in an Order dated
September 27, 2001, finding that the Petitioner had "... failed to prove by a preponderance of
evidence that his current back problems arise out of and in the course of his employment with the
Respondent." (Rl at 81-90). A signed copy of said Order is attached hereto in Addendum "B".
A Petition for Review was filed with the Commission on October 25, 2001. (Rl at 92-95).
The Commission affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and on February 28, 2002
denied the Motion for Review. (Rl at 126-131). A signed copy of said Order is attached hereto in
Addendum "C".
A Petition for Review was timelyfiledwith this Court on March 27,2002. (Rl at 133-134).
Statement of Facts: The relevant facts in this matter are simple, straightforward and not
disputed by the parties. A complete, detailed and unchallenged statement of facts is contained in the
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Administrative Law Judge, dated
3

September 27,2001 (Rl at81-90, See also, Addendum "B"). The Commission in it's Order Denying
Motion for Review dated February 28, 2002 adopted those Findings. (Rl at 127; See also.
Addendum "C"). For the sake of clarity, a brief summary of the facts follows:
On August 29, 1995, Mr. Hone was employed as a dry rock crusher operator for the
Respondent Geneva Rock. He arrived for his usual shift at 3:00 a.m. Hisfirstjob assignment of the
day was to take apart the rock crusher to remove and change the screens, an assignment that usually
takes a full shift to complete. He began work on the screens at 4:00 a.m. with three to four other
employees. In order to do this he had to crawl in small areas of the crusher where there was
approximately 30 inches of clearance. The screens weighed between 80 and 100 pounds and Mr.
Hone had to unbolt the screens and push and pull while in awkward positions in order to accomplish
this job assignment. (Rl at 81; See also. Addendum "B,"Administrative Law Judge's Amended
Finding of Fact No. 2).
Mr. Hone worked continuously at this activity for four straight hours until all the screens were
removed, at which time he took a twenty minute break. When Mr. Hone returned to work, he was
assigned to the yard to clean up metal strips that were laying in the open area of the yard. The metal
strips were approximately eight feet long, 2-1/4 inches thick and weighed approximately 20 pounds.
He was required to pick them up one at a time with both hands and then throw them six to ten feet
into the scoop of afrontend loader, which was about two-three feet off the ground. This required
him to bend over, turn with both feet and torso to pick up the strips and stand up and turn again with
his feet and torso while throwing the strips the indicated distance. (Rl at 82; See also. Addendum
"B," Administrative Law Judge's Amended Finding of Fact No. 3). The total force and functionally
applied exertion of that activity was never delineated by the Administrative Law Judge or the
Commission.
4

As Mr. Hone was turning backfromthrowing the second 20 pound strip and bent over to pick
up the third strip, he felt a sharp, sudden pain in his back. He initially believed he had a kidney stone,
so he continued his shift, even though in pain. (Rl at 82; See also, Addendum "B," Administrative
Law Judge's Amended Finding of Fact No. 4). He reported for work the next morning, but was in
too much pain to continue working and at noon reported that he had been hurt the previous day, was
in great pain and needed medical treatment. (Rl at 82; See also. Addendum "B," Administrative Law
Judge's Amended Finding of Fact No. 5).
Mr. Hone was seen by Dr. John W. Nelson that same day. A kidney stone was ruled out and
on August 31, 1995 an MRI was done at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center and compared to a
prior MRI which had been taken of his back 10 weeks previously, on June 13,1995. The August 31,
1995 MRI, taken two days after his industrial injury, noted significant bulging of the L2-3 disc space
impinging the left side of the thecal sac and extending toward the left neural foramina and stenosis
due to narrowing of the AP diameter. The impression was status-post L4-5 S1 fusion to degenerative
disc disease with desiccations of the L2-3, L3-4 discs. (R2 at 561 (medical exhibit) and Rl at 82; See
also. Addendum "B," Administrative Law Judge's Amended Finding of Fact No. 6) j
On December 4, 1995, Dr. Howard Reichman performed a re-exploration of lumbar fusion,
take-down of the fusion at the upper part of L4, laminectomy at L2-3, discectomy on the left side of
L2-3 and wide nerve root decompression and tied it into the prior fusion. The postoperative
diagnosis was failed back syndrome with spinal stenosis at L2-3, L3-4 and disk herniation on the left
side at L2-3.

(R2 at 572-576 (medical exhibit) and Rl at 82; See also, Addendum "B,"

Administrative Law Judge's Amended Finding of Fact No. 7).
On March 13,1997, Dr. Max Root found Mr. Hone to be medically stable following a second
fusion and discectomy performed December 4,1995. Dr. Root gave Mr. Hone a 12% whole person
5

impairment rating using the AMA guides for his August 29, 1995 industrial accident. (R2 at 103
(medical exhibit) and Rl at 84; See also. Addendum "B," Administrative Law Judge's Finding ofFact
No. 14).
The Defendants accepted that rating and in a Compensation Agreement drafted by the
Defendants and approved by the Commission on July 15, 1997, they admitted the occurrence of an
industrial accident, confirmed their liability and payment to Mr. Hone for temporary, total disability
compensation, and agreed to pay him an additional amount for permanent, partial disability
compensation benefits equivalent to a 12% whole body impairment, as well as future medical
expenses occasioned by the industrial accident. (Rl at 5).
Mr. Hone has been unable to return to work since his industrial injury of August 29,1995.
(Rl at 86; See also. Addendum "B," Administrative Law Judge's Amended Finding of Fact No.
22).

On February 6, 1997, Mr. Dell Felix, a physical therapist, performed the first of two

functional capacity evaluations. At that time, Mr. Felix found that Mr. Hone could sit for only
two to three hours and could not stand straight or for longer than 10-15 minutes at one time. He
could lift 55 pounds and carry the weight 25 feet, could go up and down stairs, but could not walk
on a treadmill for more than seven minutes. Mr. Felix's opinion was that Mr. Hone was in the
medium physical demand characteristic of work based on hand function and lift/carry ability,
although he was limited in his work ability due to the need to alternate sitting and standing with
significant limits on standing. A second functional capacity evaluation was performed four years
later on May 21-22, 2001, and at that time Mr. Hone did not meet the sedentary physical demand
work level. (R2 atl34-141 (medical exhibit) andRl at 85; See also, Addendum"B," Administrative
Law Judge's Amended Finding of Fact No. 19).
Mr. Hone has not worked for wages since 1995. His last job was in 1995 when he tried
6

substitute teaching, but was unsuccessful due to his inability to sit or stand for any sustained time.
He has to alternate standing and laying down. He has difficulty sitting. He had to lean on something
while standing because his back could not support him. At the time of the Hearing he could lift a
maximum of six pounds while bent over so long as he could lean on something while doing so, and
could kneel and climb one to two rungs on a ladder. He had tofrequentlylay down to minimize his
pain. He could do little around the house and if he drove for longer than a short errand, he had to stop
frequently so that he could stand and walk around. (Rl at 85-86; See also. Addendum "B,"
Administrative Law Judge's Amended Findings of Fact No.20-22).
Mr. Hone was awarded Social Security disability with an onset date of August 29,1995,
the date of his industrial injury. The Social Security award referenced chronic back problems as
the primary basis for his award. (Rl at 10-12).
On May 21, 2001, almost six years after his industrial accident, Mr. Hone reported for
an "independent medical evaluation" with Dr. Richard T. Knoebel, who was selected by the
Respondent employer/carrier.

Dr. Knoebel diagnosed chronic low back pain without

radiculopathy, status post two fusions, psychological factors affecting physical condition, chronic
narcotic habituation and current pulmonary problems. Dr. Knoebel's opinion was that the August
29, 1995 injury was not the cause of Mr. Hone's current medical condition. (R2 at 534-543
(medical exhibit and Rl at 85; See also. Addendum "B," Administrative Law Judge's Amended
Finding of Fact No. 19).
Mr. Hone does have a history of lower back pain and even a prior back surgery. In 1976
he suffered a work-related injury while working in a construction shop where he lifted a 55 gallon
drum of oil weighing in excess of 300 pounds. That injury required a debridement and fusion L-4
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to the sacrum. He was awarded a 15% whole person permanent partial disability rating as a result
of the three level fusion involving two disk spaces when he was approximately 28 years old. (R2
at 3 (medical exhibit) and Rl at 73 ; See also. Addendum "B," Administrative Law Judge's
Amended Finding of Fact No. 8).
Following that injury he worked construction from 1977 through 1985. He sold real estate
for a short time in 1985. In January 1986 through 1988, he worked for a mining company in the
front office and did some parts running. From 1988 through 1991, he worked as an accounts
manager. During 1992 he worked in sales and then for the next one-and-a-half years he helped
organize and manage a meat plant in Springville, Utah. Mr. Hone had been working for the
Defendants for one and a half years prior to the August 1995 industrial injury. (Rl at 86; See also.
Addendum "B," Administrative Law Judge's Amended Finding of Fact No. 23).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is no reasonable dispute that Mr. Hone suffered a compensable industrial injury in the
course and scope of his employment on August 29, 1995. The Respondent Employer/Carrier have
admitted liability and the compensability of Mr. Hone's accident by entering into a Compensation
Agreement, duly approved by the Utah Labor Commission. The Respondent's are thus estopped
from now arguing that the injury is not compensable.
Mr. Hone's accident meets the standard of legal and medical causation set forth in the Allen
case. Although he admittedly had a pre-existing back injury and thus is required to show "unusual
or extraordinary exertion" he clearly did so. His work activities on the day in question were unusual
and very strenuous. The Commission erred in focusing on only a single activity and not the entire
day's work.
Finally, Mr. Hone's injuries were caused, in large part by the repetitive exertion and
8

commutative trauma he suffered in his 20 year work history of manual labor. He is entitled to
compensation as such activity lead to his present permanent total disability status.
ARGUMENT
I
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY IN
FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO COVERAGE
ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED WORKER.
Few principles of workers compensation law are as well established in this State as that
workers' compensation disability claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits,
and any doubts raisedfromthe evidence are to be resolved in favor of the claim. Utah Courts have
consistently reiterated this principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796
P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983);
Prows v. Industrial Commission. 610P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567
P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v.
Industrial Commission. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964): M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189P.2d
132 (Utah 1948); and Chandlery. Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, discussed the proper construction of the
Workers' Compensation Act and the underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows:
We are also reminded that our statute requires that the statues of this state are
to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice.'
* * * * * *

In this connection it must be remembered that the compensation provided for
in the act is in no sense to be considered as damages for the injured employee or to
his dependents in case death supervenes. Therightto compensation arises out of the
relation existing between employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of [or]
in the course of the employment. Under such an act the costs and expenses of
conducting the business or enterprise, including compensation for injuries to
'employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the business. The theory of the
9

Compensation Act is that the whole cost and expense of conducting the business as
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are produced and sold, and hence,
in the long run, such costs and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such an act, therefore, is to
protect the employee and those dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury
or death to provide adequate means for the support of those dependent upon him. In
view, therefore, that in case of total disability or death of the employee his dependents
might become the objects of public charity, such a calamity is avoided by requiring the
business or enterprise to provide for such dependents, with therightof the employer
to add the amount that is paid out to the cost of producing and selling the product of
such business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such acts are therefore
apparent to all and for that reason, if for no other, should receive a very liberal
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are all united upon the proposition
that in view of the purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt respecting the
right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the employee or his
dependents as the case may be. Id. at 1021-1022. (Emphasis added)
Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in the record, it must be resolved in favor of the
injured worker and the awarding of benefits. The Utah Labor Commission and the Administrative
Law Judge, however, failed to properly apply this vital rule of construction. Their Findings and
Conclusions do not evidence a "liberal construction" and "resolution of doubt in favor of the claim."
Rather, when there is any doubt in the record, particularly as to Mr. Hone's pre-existing injuries, they
construe those facts and the inferences from them against him. A fair reading of the facts indicates
that Mr. Hone's industrial accident of August 29, 1995 is clearly compensable and is the proximate
cause of his current permanent total disability status.

n
THE RESPONDENTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM DISPUTING THE LEGAL AND
MEDICAL CAUSATION OF PETITIONER'S INJURIES BY REASON OF A SIGNED
AND APPROVED COMPENSATION AGREEMENT AND THE PAYMENT OF
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME,
Petitioner's injuriesfromhis August 29,1995 industrial accident were so severe that he was
never able to return to work for his employer. The Respondent Employer/Carrier voluntarily paid him
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temporary total disability benefits in the sum of $36,035.00 for the period of August 30,1995 through
March 13, 1997. They also paid medical expenses in the amount of $65,172.00.
On March 13, 1997, Dr. Max Root found Mr. Hone to be medically stable following his
second fusion and discectomy. Dr. Root gave Mr. Hone a 12% whole person impairment rating using
the AMA guides for his August 29, 1995 industrial accident. (R2 at 103 (medical exhibit) and Rl
at 84; See also. Addendum "B," Administrative Law Judge's Amended Finding of Fact No. 14).
The Respondent Employer/Carrier did not dispute that rating, nor did they have Mr. Home
evaluated by their own doctors, although they were certainly entitled to do so. Instead, they ratified
and accepted that rating and prepared a formal, written Compensation Agreement, which by its
express terms recognized that Mr. Hone had experienced an industrial injury in the course and scope
of his employment. The Agreement referenced the August 29, 1995 injury date, indicated that the
employer carrier had paid temporary total disability benefits as well as medical expenses, and that they
were additionally liable for $10,707.84 for the 12% impairment of the whole person due to the
industrial injury. (Rl at 5). Attached to the Agreement were the Employer's First Report of Injury
or Illness (Form 122), the Physician's Initial Report (Form 123), the Initial Statement of Insurance
Carrier or Self-Insurer With Respect to Payment of Benefits (Form 141) and the impairment rating
by Dr. Root. (Rl at 5).
The Compensation Agreement was signed by Mr. Home and an adjuster for the Respondent
workers compensation carrier. The Agreement stated that "It is understood that this agreement
becomes binding and effective only when it is approved by the Industrial Commission of Utah."
(Emphasis added). On July 15,1997 the Agreement was "reviewed and approved" by the Industrial
Commission, making the obligations a legally enforceable Order. (Rl at 5).
Mr. Hone was justified in his belief that the Compensation Agreement fully addressed his
11

entitlement to compensation and that his employer/carrier admitted liability, paid compensation and
medical expenses and entered into a written agreement evidencing that obligation. The Compensation
Agreement is res judicata on the issue of legal and medical causation.
The Commission considered Petitioner's estoppel argument in his Motion for Review and
dismissed it, stating:
... as noted by the Utah Court of Appeals in Olsen v. Industrial Commission, 776 P.2d
937, 940 (Utah App. 1989), an employer or insurance company that initially pays
benefits is not estopped from later denying liability unless the claimant demonstrates
he or she has changed position or relinquished somerightas a result of the [sic] such
payments. The Court of Appeals also observed in Olsen that imposing estoppel
against employers and insurance carriers that initially paid benefits voluntarily 'would
encourage employers and insurance carriers to contest all employment related injuries
to avoid later being estopped from raising their claims.'
The Court of Appeals' decision in Olsen governs the circumstances of Mr.
Hone's claim. The Commission agrees with the ALJ that Mr. Hone has not
established that he was prejudiced by Geneva's initial payment of benefits. The
Commission therefore concludes that Geneva is not estopped from denying liability
for Mr. Hone's current claim for additional benefits.
(Rl at 127-128; See also. Addendum "C" Order Denying Motion for Review, pages 2-3).
Respondents misread Olsen which dealt with the voluntary payment of compensation and did
not involve a Compensation Agreement signed by the parties and approved by the Commission, as
is the case here. All of the Utah cases and the passagefromthe workmen's compensation treatise
by Professor Larson, cited by the Olsen Court dealt with the voluntary payment of temporary total
compensation and medical expenses and not compensation pursuant to a formal Compensation
Agreement which was approved by the Commission.
Petitioner does not claim that the Respondent Employer/Carrier's payment oftemporary total
compensation and medical expenses prior to the Compensation Agreement results in estopping them
from denying legal and medical causation; but, rather, that their entering into a written Compensation
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Agreement, which was then reviewed and approved by the Commission, and the payment of
additional compensation after the entry of the Agreement, does constitute res judicata and estoppel.
The Respondent's payments after the Compensation Agreement were not "voluntary," but were
legally mandated and enforceable. In fact, not only did Respondents pay Mr. Hone 12% whole
person permanent, partial disability benefits pursuant to the Compensation Agreement after it had
been approved and entered as an enforceable award by the Commission, but also paid additional
medical expenses in the amount of $47,923.64, for a total of $113,095.64, by the time Respondents
filed their Answer to Mr. Hone's Application for permanent, total disability benefits. (Rl at 25).
Professor Larson in his treatise notes that: "If the settlement is approved, it takes on the
quality of an award, and the parties can no more back out of it than any other kind of award." 8
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 132.06 (2) at 132-12 (05/01).

Entering into a

Compensation Agreement waives the right to subsequently make compensability an issue as other
jurisdictions have held (cited approvingly by Larson). E. g. Mvrick v. Gillard Grove Service, 577 So.
2d 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Gates. 225 Ga. 824, 171 S.E.
723 (1969); Ahlers v. Sears. Roebuck & Co.. 73 IU.2d 259, 383 N.E.2d 207 (1978); and Rangelv.
Harford Accident & Indemnity Co., 821 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
This legal principle is supported by public policy. Employers and their insurance carriers
would still be encouraged to voluntarily pay temporary total compensation and medical expenses, as
those "voluntary" payments can not be used as an admission of liability. However, once the insurance
carrier goes to the step of reducing it's obligations to a stipulated agreement with the injured worker,
including a provision for future benefits and that agreement is approved by the Commission, it is
binding and conclusive on the issue of whether legal and medical causation has been established.
The Olsen Court's requirement of detrimental reliance was directed to "voluntary" payments
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prior to a signed and Commission approved Compensation Agreement. Olsen at 940. There is no
requirement in Utah law that a party prove that he/she has detrimentally relied on an award/order in
order for it to be enforceable. Once the provisions of the parties agreement are reduced to a written
Compensation Agreement and it is approved by the Commission, it is res judicata to all issues
covered therein and the parties are estopped from subsequently relitigating the same issues.

in
THE PETITIONER'S INJURY ON AUGUST 29. 1995 IS A COMPENSABLE
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BECAUSE IT MEETS THE ALLEN TEST REGARDING
LEGAL AND MEDICAL CAUSATION.
An employee is entitled to compensation for an injury which occurs as a result of an "accident
arising out of and in the course of his [or her] employment," Utah Code Annotated, § 34A-2-101 et.
sgfl., even though, as in the case at bar, the employee suffers from a preexisting condition. Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986). Allen established a two-prong analysis for
determining whether an employee suffering from a preexisting condition is entitled to compensation
under Utah Code Annotated, § 34A-2-101, et. seq. First, the claimant must show that the injury
occurred by "accident." Id. at 18. An accident is defined as:
an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally be
expected to occur in the usual course of events
This is not necessarily restricted
to some single incident which happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or other repetitive cause, a climax
might be reached in such manner as to properly fall within the definition of an accident
as just stated above. Id- (quoting Carting v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260,
261-62, 399 P.2d 202, 203 (1965) (citations omitted)).
It is undisputed that Mr. Hone suffered an "accident," thereby satisfying thefirstprong of the
analysis. The Respondent Employer/Carrier recognized this by paying him temporary total and
permanent partial disability compensation, for time offwork and an acknowledged 12% whole person
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impairment - including extensive medical care - related to the August 29,1995 industrial injury. The
Commission in it's Order Denying Motion for Review also does not dispute that Mr. Hone suffered
an injury by "accident."
A claimant must next show the injury arose out of and in the course of his [or her]
employment, or that there exists a "causal connection between the injury and the employment.M Id.
at 18. In order to demonstrate the necessary causal connection, Allen established a two-part
requirement of legal causation and medical causation. The Allen test distinguishes between claimants
who have a pre-existing condition and those who do not. For those in the first category (like Mr.
Hone), it must be shown that the employment contributed "something substantial to increase the
risk... already faced in everyday life because of [the] condition." Id at 24. Essential to demonstrating
legal causation is a showing of unusual or extraordinary exertion "where the claimant suffers from
a preexisting condition which contributes to the injury." Id. at 26.
The Utah Supreme Court in Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission. 731 P.2d 1079,
1082 (Utah 1986) noted that:
the question of whether the employment activities of a given employee are sufficient
to satisfy the legal standard of unusual or extraordinary effort involves two steps.
First, the agency must determine as a matter of fact exactly what were the
employment-related activities of the injured employee. Second, the agency must
decide whether those activities amounted to unusual or extraordinary exertion.
(Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has made clear that the key ingredient of an industrial accident is an unexpected
occurrence. That occurrence may be "either the cause or the result of an injury." In Hone v. J. F.
Shea Company, 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986^ the Court stated as follows:
We expressly rejected the position that the determination of an 'accident' depends
upon the happening of an unusual event or occurrence such as a slip, a fall, or an
extraordinary exertion. Id. We said that so long as 'the cause of the injury or the
result of an exertion was different from what would normally be expected to occur,
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the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore by accident.' Id.
at 1009.
The Utah Supreme Court in Hone, went on to clarify the application of the "unusual exertion"
standard for pre-existing injuries, holding that:
The comparison between the usual and unusual exertion is defined according to an
objective standard. ' Note that the comparison is not with this employee's usual
exertion in his employment but with the exertions of normal nonemployment life of
this or any other person.' Allen at 16 (quoting Larson, Workmen's Compensation.
Sec 38.83 (b) at 7-279 (1986). (Emphasis in original). Id. 1012.
The clear facts of this case establish that on the date of his injury, Mr. Hone was engaged in
extremely strenuous, unusual and extraordinary effort. The Administrative Law Judge made specific
Findings that Mr Hone was required to crawl in small areas where there was only approximately 2-Vi
feet of clearance. While in that limited and awkward position, he was required to push and pull metal
screens weighing between 80 and 100 pounds to remove them. He performed these activities nonstop for at least four straight hours. After a mere 20 minute break, he was assigned to throw 20
pound strips of metal, approximately eight feet long, six to 10 feet into a bucket two to three feet off
the ground. It was on the second strip of metal that Mr. Hone felt a "sudden sharp pain" in his back.
The Commission in it's Order Denying Motion for Review completely disregards Mr. Hone's
four straight hours of "awkward" and strenuous labor which had left him "wet with sweat" (Rl at

...Mr. Hone completed such activities with no problems and then took a rest break.
It was only after he had commenced the entirely different work activity of picking up
metal strips and throwing them into the bucket of afront-endloader that he felt the
acute back pain which ultimately resulted in his current claim. Under these
circumstances, it is Mr. Hone's activity of picking up metal strips, not his earlier
activity of removing screens from the rock crusher, that must satisfy the more
stringent prong of the Allen test for legal causation.
(Rl at 129; See also, Addendum "C" Order Denying Motion for Review, page 4).
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None of the examining doctors could relate Mr. Hone's injuries to a specific event, i.e.,
whether his back injury was the result of the four hours of strenuous labor removing the screens or
the relatively heavy labor of lifting and/or the throwing of the 20 pound strips of metal a few minutes
later. Doing so would probably be a medical impossibility, given the very short gap in time between
the two activities. Although Mr. Hone did not feel the "sudden sharp pain" until he was picking up
and throwing the heavy pieces of metal, it is medically impossible to say that his injury resulted from
the throwing of the metal strips, the removal of the screens or a combination of both. Indeed, since
both activities occurred in close proximity to each other, no differentiation is necessary as they were
the result of the day's work activity which included both job assignments.
It strains credulity to suggest that Mr. Hone's activities of removing the screens did not
constitute unusual or extraordinary exertion. The Findings of the Administrative Law Judge, which
were adopted by the Commission, are replete with references to the unusual nature of this activity;
it was only done once a month; the four hours removing screens weighing 80-100 pounds; the small
area into which Mr. Hone had to crawl; the heavy weight of the screens and the pushing and pulling
required to remove them in an awkward position. Less than half an hour later, Mr. Hone was
required to pick up eight foot strips of metal weighing over 20 lbs and throw them six to 10 feet into
a bucket. By any definition, this is unusual and extraordinary exertion.
It is important to recognize that it can not be assumed that merely because a claimant has preexisting injuries that he is subject to the more "stringent" standard under the Allen test. In Nvrehn
v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990, cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991)
the Court of Appeals noted that:
An A.L. J. may not simply presume that thefindingof a preexisting condition warrants
application of the Allen test. An employer must prove medically that the claimant
"suffersfroma preexisting condition which contributes to the injury. Allen, 729 P.2d
17

at 26. See, e.g., Price River Coal Co.. 731 P.2d at 1092.
•**

...The A.L. J. had merely concluded as a matter of law that * since Ms. Nyrehn brought
a pre-existing low back condition to the workplace,' the Allen test applied. Implicit
in such a legal conclusion is the critical factual finding that Nyrehn's pre-existing
condition contributed to her injury. Such material findings, however, may not be
implied. Id. at 334.
The Court went on to clarify that:
Just because a person suffers a preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified from
obtaining compensation. Our cases make clear that 'the aggravation or lighting up
of a pre-existing disease by an industrial accident is compensable...' Allen. 729 P.2d
at 25 (quoting Powers v. Industrial Commission. 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d
740, 743 (1967).
The Commission committed error when it concluded that the "... more stringent, prong applies
where such a preexistng condition does exist." (Rl at 129; See also. Addendum "C" Order Denying
Motion for Review, page 4). Neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the Commission, however,
made any finding that Mr. Hone's pre-existing condition contributed to his injury; nor do they
consider whether any such pre-existing injury was "aggravated or lighted up" by the industrial
accident. Without such a factualfinding,there is no basis for the application of the "higher" or "more
stringent" standard of "unusual or extraordinary exertion" and Mr. Hone was entitled to application
of the lower standard of "usual or ordinary exertion."
Despite Mr. Hone's admitted pre-existing injuries, it is clear that he had returned to gainful
employment prior to his industrial injury of August 29, 1995. The record supports afindingthat he
had been so engaged for almost 20 years. The Administrative Law Judge's Findings indicate that he
had worked at this particular job with its heavy lifting in awkward conditions for about a year and a
half. (Rl at 86, See also Addendum "B" Administrative Law Judge's Amended Findings of Fact No.
23).

18

This fact alone shows that Mr. Hone's pre-existing injuries, no matter how severe did not
preclude him from returning to work. Despite those cumulative injuries he worked for the
Defendants under heavy labor conditions for over one and a half years.
Medical causation requires a showing that "the disability is medically the result of an exertion
or injury that occurred during a work-related activity." Allen at 27. Mr. Hone undeniably suffered
an "accident" in the course and scope of his employment with the Respondent. Following that injury,
he never returned to work. The Respondent Employer/Carrier recognized the existence of medical
causation in paying over $113,095.64 in medical expenses over a period of more thanfive(5) years
following his industrial injury. (Rl at 25).
In addition, Dr. Root found that Mr. Hone had sustained a 12% impairment of the whole
person by reason of his August 29,1995 injury. (R2 at 103 (medical exhibit) and Rl at 84; See also.
Addendum "B," Administrative Law Judge's Finding of Fact No. 14). The Respondents did not
dispute this causation and in fact, relied upon it in preparing and signing a Compensation Agreement,
which provided for the payment of medical expenses and permanent partial disability as a result of
the August 29, 1995 injury.
Mr. Hone clearly established that he had experienced an "unusual or extraordinary exertion."
His medical records further demonstrate that the August 29, 1995 injury resulted in substantial
impairment. As such, he has satisfied the causation requirements of the Allen test.
IV
THE ORDER OF THE LABOR COMMISSION FAILS TO ADDRESS ALL OF THE
PETITIONER'S WORK ACTIVITIES ON THE DAY OF HIS INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT,
The Respondent Utah Labor Commission in it's Order Denying Motion concluded as follows:
... it is necessary to identify the actual work activity that gives rise to Mr. Hone's
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claim. Mr. Hone argues that his work activities included the lifting, pulling and
twisting he had engaged in during the morning of August 29, 1995. However, as
noted by the ALJ, Mr. Hone completed such activities with no problems and then
took a rest break. It was only after he had commenced the entirely different work
activity of picking up metal strips and throwing them into the bucket of a front-end
loader that he felt the acute back pain which ultimately resulted in his current claim.
Under these circumstances, it is Mr. Hone's activity of picking up metal strips, not his
earlier activity of removing screensfromthe rock crusher, that must satisfy the more
stringent prong of the Allen test for legal causation.
(Rl at 129; See also. Addendum "C," Order Denying Motion for Review, page 4).
That analysis, however, focuses on just one activity and does not consider the entire scope
of Mr. Hone's work related exertions over the work day.
In Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260,399 P.2d 202 (1965) the Court held as
follows:
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, unintended occurrence differentfromwhat
would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of events.... [T]his is not
necessarily restricted to some single incident which happened suddenly at one
particular time and does not preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or
other repetitive cause, a climax might be reached in such manner as to properly fall
within the definition of an accident as just stated above. However, such an occurrence
must be distinguished from gradually developing conditions which are classified as
occupational diseases....
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d 203 (citations omitted).
In Kaiser Steel v. MonfredL 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981), the Court affirmed an award of
workers1 compensation benefits to an employee who suffered a back injury resulting from exertion
or stress from shoveling coal. The Court applied the "cumulative trauma" theory from Carling
whereby an internal failure may be an accident if it is a "'climax1 due to exertion, stress, or other
repetitive cause... in such a manner as to properly fall within the definition of an accident." 631 P.2d
at 892 (quoting from Carling, 16 Utah 2d at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203).
In Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330 (Utah App. 1990, cert, denied. 815 P.2d
241 (Utah 1991) the Court of Appeals noted that:
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The Utah Supreme Court has broadly defined 'accident' to include injuries which
are the result of repetitive exertion.
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, unintended occurrence
different from what would normally be expected to occur in the
usual course of events.... This in not necessarily restricted to some
single incident which happened suddenly at one particular time and
does not preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or other
repetitive cause, a climax might be reached in such a manner as to
properly fall within the definition of an accident as just stated
above. Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260,261-62,
399 P.2d 202, 203 (1965) quoted with approval in Allen. 729 P.2d
at 18.
When an accident is the climax of repeated exertions, as in Nyrehn's case,
work-related 'exertion,1 for purpose of proving legal causation, is the aggregate
exertion of the repetitive exertions that establish the accident. See
Miera v.
Industrial Commission. 728 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1986) (claimant's repetitive
'jumps into an eight-foot hole [by way of] a flour-foot platform at thirty-minute
intervals constitute a considerably greater exertion than that encountered in nonemployment life'). Id. at 335.
The error of the Commission was in myopically focusing on one particular event while
ignoring the "gradually developing conditions" during the entire work day that contributed to the
severity of Mr. Hone's injuries. It is manifest error to focus on a single activity during the work day.
The clear law of this State is that the Commission must consider all of the work related activities on
the entire day of the injury. As this Court made clear in Nvrehn v. Industrial CommissionL 800 P.2d
330, 335 (Utah App. 1990, cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991) "...we must consider the whole
burden on the camel and not just the straw that breaks the camel's back."
Such a holding is supported by a long line of Utah cases. See. Price River Coal Co. v.
Industrial Commission. 731 P.2d 1079,1083 (Utah 1986) (to conclude whether work-related exertion
was unusual or extraordinary, court must determine what worker's job-related actives where on the
day of death); Smith & Edwards Co. v. Industrial Commission. 770 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Utah App.
1989) (work-related activities were activities on day in question); Sisco Hilte v. Industrial
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Commission, 766P.2d 1089,1091 (Utah App. 1989) (ALJ'sfindingsregarding employment-related
activities involved exertion on day of injury); and Workers Compensation Fund v. Industrial
Commission. 761 P.2d 575 (Utah 1988) (comparing cumulative effect of several factors, including
driver's fatigue, anxiety, and the stress of driving through a snow storm, with the exertions of
nonemployment life).
Therefore, the Commission erred in limiting examination of Mr. Hone's industrial injuries to
a single event rather than the additional four hours plus a brief respite immediately before his sudden
accident. Utah and other jurisdictions are virtually unanimous on this point, which requires reversal
of the agency's improper and restrictive approach to the occurrence of an industrial accident.
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
In conclusion, the Respondents are estopped from claiming that Mr. Hone did not incur
a compensable industrial event because of their submission of a Compensation Agreement,
approved and entered by the Commission. In addition, Mr. Hone satisfies the legal requirement for
establishing an industrial accident as required by the underlying Allen decision.
Petitioner respectfully requests that thefinalagency action in Mr. Hone's case be reversed,
and that his claim be remanded to the Commission for the purpose of reviewing his request for a
tentativefindingof permanent, total disability as provided by Utah law.
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2002.
DABNEY & DABNEY, p.c.

lus Ipabney
Daniel L. Hone
Counsel
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Addendum A
Utah Code Annotated, § 34A-2-413 (1997)
and
R612-1-10 of the Utah Administrative Code

34A-2-413

UTAH LABOR CODE

Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692
P.2d 779 (Utah 1984) (decided before 1988
amendment).
A worker's cause of action accrues when the
industrial accident occurs; a worker who knew
of his accident within the eight-year limitations
period and had his first medical operation
within that period, but sought to amend his
award after that period, was time-barred from
bringing such claims. Middlestadt v. Indus,
Comm'n, 852 R2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Test of total disability.
Employee who had only partial loss of vision
which was subject to correction by use of
glasses did not sustain total disability: the test
&
... . 1 , 1 .
, ,,
•/
.
r
of sucn disability bemg whether it prevents
employee from doing work for which he is

adapted, and not that in which he was injured.
United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co. v.
Evans, 35 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1929), cert, denied,
281 U.S. 744, 50 S. Ct. 350, 74 L. Ed. 1157
(1930).
Unknown preexisting condition.
^ft e r an accident aggravated a preexisting
asvmptomatic condition of emplovee, he was
entitled to full compensation for" the twenty
pe rcent whole person permanent partial impairment caused by the accident. Crosland v.
Board
of Review, 828 P.2d 528 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert
- denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
~.. , . 0
, n
^OAOOJ
D
n
Cited m Booms v. Rapp Constr. Co., 720 P.2d
_ „ (Utah 1986)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation
§ 562 et seq.
A.LJL — Workers' compensation: reopening

lump-sum
compensation
A.L.R.5th 127.

payment,
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34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation.
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial
accident or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation
as outlined in this section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of
evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination
of impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational
disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct
cause of the employee's permanent total disability.
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission
shall conclude that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the employee from performing the
essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has
been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational
disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability
claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available,
taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past work
experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other
than those provided under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
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Disease Act, if relevant, may be presented to the commission, but is not
binding and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-wTeek
intitlement, compensation shall be 66-%% of the employee's average weekly
vage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury;
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per
week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor
children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a)
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the
injury; and
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate
under Subsection (2Kb) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly
wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the
course of the employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance earner is liable for the initial 312
weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in
Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided
in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections
34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of compensation
payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the
employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the
employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's
employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for
any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation
at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total
disability compensation.
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability
under Subsection (3)*or Section 34A-2-703.
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the
course of the employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total
disability compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided
in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections
34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of compensation
payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
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(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the
employer or its insurance carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the
compensation payable by the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation from the
employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability
compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the
dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the
employee during the same period.
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final,
unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured
Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified
rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return the employee to
gainful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier provides
the administrative law judge notice that the employer or its insurance
carrier will not submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds
a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding
rehabilitation and to review amy reemployment plan submitted by the
employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge
shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's subsistence; and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits
due the employee.
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any
disability payments made under Subsection (6)(b) against its ultimate
disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act.
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit
a reemployment plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily
submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(d)(i) through (iii).
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, job placement services, or incentives
calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its
insurance carrier.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue
the reemployment plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure
to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the
administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own
motion to make a final decision of permanent total disability.
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(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administrative law judge shall order that the
employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits.
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became
permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the
commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady
work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a
permanently totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate,
part-time work in a job earning at least minimum wage provided that
employment may not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the
employee from Social Security disability benefits.
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment
process and accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work.
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income
from the work provided under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier may reduce the employee's permanent total
disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of $500.
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its
insurance carrier, a permanently totally disabled employee may obtain
medically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset provisions
contained in Subsection (7)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time
work and offset.
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under Subsection (7) is
governed by Part 8, Adjudication.
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof
to show that medically appropriate part-time work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require
the employee to undertake work exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual functional capacity or for good cause; or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent
total disability benefits as provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable,
medically appropriate, part-time employment has been offered but the
employee has failed to fully cooperate.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award
shall be for permanent partial disability.
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not
entitled to disability compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with
any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah
Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss without
prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the administrative law judge
finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative law
judge states specific findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice.
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands,
both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such
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body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection
(10)(a) is final.
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a
permanent total disability claim, except those based on Subsection (10),
for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or has payment
responsibility to determine whether the worker remains permanently
totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three
years after an award is final, unless good cause is shown by the employer
or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent reexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations
and retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110;
and
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires
approved by the division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a
reexamination with appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to
rule for reasonable travel allowance and per diem as well as reasonable
expert witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's
claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total disability finding, an administrative law judge
may order the suspension of the employee's permanent total disability
benefits until the employee cooperates with the reexamination.
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding
reveal evidence that reasonably raises the issue of an employee's
continued entitlement to permanent total disability compensation
benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be
accompanied by documentation supporting the insurer's or selfinsured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently
totally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (ll)(f)(i) demonstrates good
cause, as determined by the Division of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the sole basis for termination of an
employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but the evidence of
the employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work
under Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination or
hearing with other evidence relating to the employee's status and
condition.
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge
may award reasonable attorneys fees to an attorney retained by an
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employee to represent the employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the permanent total disability finding, except if the employee
does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. The attorneys
fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in addition to
the permanent total disability compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee
fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured employer, or the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total disability
compensation benefits due the employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall be
given effect without the invalid provision or application.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-67, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 116, § 4; 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12,
§ 1; 1991, ch. 136, § 12; 1992, ch. 53, § 2;
1994, ch. 266, § 2; 1995, ch. 177, § 2; renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 156; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 121.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1988, ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as
last amended by Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1,
relating to permanent total disability, effective
July 1, 1988, and enacts the present section.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 35A-3413 ; substituted "commission" and "administrative law judge" for "department" where the
terms appear; inserted references to "Chapter
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act" in Subsec-

tions (l)(d) and (9) and as a substitute for
"Chapter 3a" in Subsection (6)(c); substituted
"34A-2-703" for "35A-3-703" in Subsections
(3)(a) and (3)(e), "34A-2-410 through 34A-2412" and "34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507" for
"35A-3-410 through 35A-3-412" and "35A-3-501
through 35A-3-507" in Subsections (3)(b) and
(4Kb), "Chapter 8" for Chapter 9, Part 2" in
Subsection(6)(a)(i), "34A-2-110"for "35A-3-114"
in Subsection (llXcXv), and "34A-1-309" for
"35A-3-805"in Subsection (HXg); added"is governed by Part 8, Adjudication" at the end of
Subsection (7)(f)(ii); substituted "Division of
Adjudication" for "department" in Subsection
(HXfXi); inserted "as determined by the Division of Adjudication" in Subsection (HXfXii);
and made stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
would be permanently disabled as matter of
law, it was for commission to decide from all the
facts and circumstances in evidence whether he
was so disabled. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n,
93 Utah 493, 73 P.2d 1308 (1937).

ANALYSIS

Arm injuries.
Commencement of benefits.
Determination of character of disability.
Estoppel.
Evidence.
Eye injuries.
Findings.
Law in effect.
Maximum benefits.
Multiple injuries.
Odd-lot doctrine.
Permanent disability.
—Benefits.
Prior accidents contributing to disability.
Proceedings before commission.
Refusal to submit to operation.
Statute of limitations.
Total disability.
—Question offset.
Cited.

Commencement of benefits.
It is within the sound discretion of the commission to determine the commencement date
of benefits for total permanent disability so
long as the determination is supported by substantial evidence and not patently unreasonable. Oman v. Industrial Comm'n, 735 P.2d 665
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277
(Utah 1987). But see Heaton v. Second Injury
Fund, 796 R2d 676 (Utah 1990), noted under
catchline "Permanent disability — Benefits,"
below.

Arm injuries.
Where there was no complete and permanent
loss or loss of use of both arms so that claimant

Determination of character of disability.
Whether an employee is totally disabled or
permanently disabled are ultimate matters to
be decided by the commission, as is also amount
and time compensation may be awarded upon
all the evidence; and upon these ultimate questions expert witnesses may not properly ex-
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payable to the worker and his attorney jointly constitutes a violation of this rule.
R812-1-7. A c c e p t a n c e / D e n i a l of a Claim.
A. Upon receiving a claim for workers'' compensation benefits, the insurance carrier or self-insured
employer shall promptly investigate the claim and
begin payment of compensation within 21 days from
the date of notification of a valid claim or the insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall send the
claimant and the division written notice on a division
form or letter containing similar information, within
21 days of notification, t h a t further investigation is
needed stating the reason(s) for further investigation.
Each insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall
complete its investigation within 45 days of receipt of
the claim and shall commence the payment of benefits
or notify the claimant and division in writing that the
claim is denied- and the reason(s) why the claim is
being denied.
^
^
B. The payment of compensatipn shall be considered overdue if not paid within 21 days of a valid claim
or within the 45 days of investigation unless denied.
C. Failure to make payment or to deny a claim
within the 45 day time, period without good cause
shall result in a referral of the insurance company to
the Insurance Department for appropriate disciplinary action and may be cause for revocation of the
self-insurance certification for a self-insured employer. Good cause is defined as:
1. Failure by an employee claiming benefits to sign
requested medical releases;
2. Injury or occupational disease did not occur
within the scope of employment;
3. Medical information does not support the claim:
4. Claim was not filed within the statute of limit
tions;
5. Claimant is not an employee of the employer
he/she is making a claim against;
6. Claimant has failed to cooperate in the investigation of the claim;
7. A pre-existing condition is the sole cause of the
medical problem and not the claimed work-related
injury or occupational disease;
8. Tested positive for drugs or alcohol; or
9. Other - a very specific reason must be given.
D. If an insurance carrier or self-insured employer
begins payment of benefits on an investigation basis
so as to process the claim in a timely fashion, a later
denial of benefits based on newly discovered information may be allowed.
R612-1-8. I n s u r a n c e C a r r i e r / E m p l o y e r Liability.
A. This rule governs responsibility for payment of
workers' compensation benefits for industrial accidents when:
1. The worker's ultimate entitlement to benefits is
not in dispute; but
2. There is a dispute between self-insured employers and/or insurers regarding their respective liability
for the injured worker's benefits arising out of separate industrial accidents which are compensable under Utah law.
B. In cases meeting the criteria of subsection A, the
self-insured employer or insurer providing workers'
compensation coverage for the most recent compensable injury shall advance workers' compensation
benefits to the injured worker. The benefits advanced
shall be limited to medical benefits and temporary
total disability compensation. The benefits advanced

shall be paid according to the entitlement in effect on
the date of the earliest related injury.
1. The self-insured employer or insurance carrier
advancing benefits shall notify the non-advancing
partyvs) within the time periods as specified in rule
R612-1-7, that benefits are to be advanced pursuant to
this rule.
2. The self-insured employers or insurers not advancing benefits, upon notification from the advancing party, shall notify the advancing party within 10
working d rt ys of any potential defenses or limitations
of the non-advancing partyis) liability.
C. The parties are encouraged to settle liabilities
pursuant to this rule, however, any party may file a
request for agency action with the Commission for
determination of liability for the workers' compensation benefits at issue.
D. The medical utilization decisions of the selfinsured employer or insurer advancing benefits pursuant to this rule shall be presumed reasonable with
respect to the issue of reimbursement.
R612-1-9. C o m p e n s a t i o n A g r e e m e n t s .
A. An applicant, insurance company, and/or employer may enter into a compensation agreement for
the purpose of resolving a worker's compensation
claim. Compensation agreements must be approved
by the Commission. The compensation agreement
must be that contained on Form 019 of the Commission forms and shall include the following information:
1. Signatures of the parties involved;
2. Form 122 - Employer's First Report of Injury;
3. Doctor's report of impairment rating;
4. Form 141 - Payment of Benefits Statement.
B. Failure to provide any of the above documentation and forms may result in the return of the compensation agreement to the carrier or self-insured
employer without approval.
R612-1-10. P e r m a n e n t Total Disability.
A. This rule applies to claims for permanent total
disability compensation under the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
1. Subsection B applies to permanent total disability claims arising from accident or disease prior to
May 1, 1995.
2. Subsection C applies to permanent total disability claims arising from accident or disease on or after
May 1, 1995.
B. For claims arising from accident or disease on or
after July 1, 1988 and prior to May 1, 1995, the
Commission is required under Section 34A-2-413, to
make a finding of total disability as measured by the
substance of the sequential decision-making process
of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, amended April 1,
1993. The use of the term "substance of the sequential
decision-making process" is deemed to confer some
latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of
discretion in making its findings relative to permanent total disability. The Commission does not interpret the code section to eliminate the requirement
that a finding by the Commission in permanent and
total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not
final until rehabilitation training and/or evaluation
has been accomplished.
1. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee has made, or is in the process of
making, a determination of disability under the fore-
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going process, the Commission may use this information in lieu of instituting the process on its own behalf.
2. In evaluating industrial claims in which the
injured worker has qualified for Social Security disability benefits, the Commission will determine if a
significant cause of the disability is the claimant's
industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or
causes.
3. To make a tentative finding of permanent total
disability the Commission incorporates the rules of
disability determination in 20 CFR 404.1520,
amended April 1, 1993. The sequential decision making process referred to requires a series of questions
and evaluations to be made in sequence. In short,
these are:
a. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful
activity?
b. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment?
c. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the
duration requirement in 20 CFR 404.1509, amended
April 1, 1993, and the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Subpart P Appendix 1, amended April 1, 1993?
d. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from
doing past relevant work?
e. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from
doing any other work?
4. After the Commission has made a tentative
finding of permanent total disability:
a. In those cases arising after July 1,1994, the
Commission shall order initiation of payment of permanent total disability compensation;
b. the Commission shall review a summary of
reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to the
Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act, as well as
any qualified reemployment plan submitted by the
employer or its insurance carrier; and
c. unless otherwise stipulated, the Commission
shall hold a hearing to consider the possibility of
rehabilitation and reemployment of the claimant
pending final adjudication of the claim.
5. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the
parties, the Commission shall issue an order finding
or denying permanent total disability based upon the
preponderance of the evidence and with due consideration of the vocational factors in combination with the
residual functional capacity which the commission
incorporates as published in 20 CFR 404 Subpart P
Appendix 2, amended April 1, 1993.
C. For permanent total disability claims arising on
or after May 1, 1995, Section 34A-2-413 requires a
two-step adjudicative process. First, the Commission
must make a preliminary determination whether the
applicant is permanently and totally disabled. If so,
the Commission will proceed to the second step, in
which the Commission will determine whether the
applicant can be reemployed or rehabilitated.
1. First Step- Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total Disability: On receipt of an application for
permanent total disability compensation, the Adjudication Division will assign an Administrative Law
Judge to conduct evidentiary proceedings to determine whether the applicant's circumstances meet
each of the elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2413(l)(b) and (c).
(a) If the ALJ finds the applicant meets each of the
elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2-413(l)(b) and
(c), the ALJ will issue a preliminary determination of
permanent total disability and shall order the employer or insurance carrier to pay permanent total
disability compensation to the applicant pending
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completion of the second step of the adjudication
process. The payment of permanent total disability
compensation pursuant to a preliminary determination shall commence as of the date established by the
preliminary determination and shall continue until
otherwise ordered.
(b) A party dissatisfied with the ALJ's preliminary
determination may obtain additional agency review
by either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board
pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-80K3). If a timely motion for review of the ALJ's preliminary determination
is filed with either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board, no further adjudicative or enforcement
proceedings shall take place pending the decision of
the Commissioner or Board.
(c) A preliminary determination of permanent total
disability by the Labor Commissioner or Appeals
Board is a final agency action for purposes of appellate
judicial review.
(d) Unless otherwise stayed by the Labor Commissioner, the Appeals Board or an appellate court, an
appeal of the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board's
preliminary determination of permanent total disability shall not delay the commencement of "second step"
proceedings discussed below or payment of permanent
total disability compensation as ordered by the preliminary determination.
(e) The Commissioner or Appeals Board shall grant
a request for stay if the requesting party has filed a
petition for judicial review and the Commissioner or
Appeals Board determine that:
(i) the requesting party has a substantial possibility
of prevailing on the merits;
(ii) the requesting party will suffer irreparable
injury unless a stay is granted; and
(iii) the stay will not result in irreparable injury to
other parties to the proceeding.
2. Second Step-Reemployment and Rehabilitation:
P u r s u a n t to Subsection 34A-2-413(6), if the first step
of the adjudicatory process results in a preliminary
finding of permanent total disability, an additional
inquiry must be made into the applicant's ability to be
reemployed or rehabilitated, unless the parties waive
such additional proceedings.
. .
(a) The ALJ will hold a hearing to consider whether
the applicant can be reemployed or rehabilitated.
(i) As part of the hearing, the ALJ will review a
summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) The employer or insurance carrier may submit a
reemployment plan meeting the requirements set
forth in Subsection 34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii) and Subsections 34A-2-413(6)(d)(i) through (iii).
(b) P u r s u a n t to Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b) the employer or insurance carrier may not be required to pay
disability compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at
the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate.
(i) Any overpayment of disability compensation may
be recouped by the employer or insurance carrier by
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future
liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks.
(ii) An advance of disability compensation to provide
for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process is subject to the provisions of Subsection
34A-2-413(4)(b), described in subsection 2.(b) above,
but can be funded by reasonably offsetting the advance of disability compensation against future liability normally paid after the initial 312 weeks.
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(iii) To fund an advance of disability compensation
to provide for an employee's subsistence during the
rehabilitation process, a portion of the stream of
future weekly disability compensation payments may
be discounted from the future to the present to accommodate payment. Should this be necessary, tiie employer or insurance carrier shall be allowed to reasonably offset the amounts paid against future liability
payable after the initial 312 weeks. In this process,
care should be exercised to reasonably minimize adverse financial impact on the employee.
(iv) In the event the parties cannot agree as to the
reasonableness of any proposed offset, the matter may
be submitted to an ALJ for determination.
(c) Subsections 34A-2-413(7) and (9) require the
applicant to fully cooperate in any evaluation or
reemployment plan. Failure to do so shall result in
dismissal of the applicant's claim or reduction or
elimination of benefit payments including disability
compensation and subsistence allowance amounts,
consistent with the provisions of Section 34A-2-413(7)
and (9).
(d) Subsection 34A-2-413(6) requires the employer
or its insurance carrier to diligently pursue any proffered reemployment plan. Failure to do so shall result
in a final award of permanent total disability compensation to the applicant.
(e) If, after the conclusion of the foregoing "second
step" proceeding, the ALJ concludes that successful
rehabilitation is not possible, the ALJ shall enter a
final order for continuing payment of permanent total
disability compensation. The period for payment of
such compensation shall be commence on the date the
employee became permanently and totally disabled,
as determined by the ALJ.
.(f) Alternatively, if after the conclusion of the "second step" proceeding, the ALJ concludes that successful rehabilitation and/or reemployment is possible,
the ALJ shall enter a final order to that effect, which
order shall contain such direction to the parties as the
ALJ shall deem appropriate for successful implementation and continuation of rehabilitation and/or reemployment. As necessary under the particular circumstances of each case, the ALJ's final order shall
provide for reasonable offset of payments of any
disability compensation that constitute an overpayment under Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b).
(g) The ALJ's decision is subject to all administrative and judicial review provided by law.
R612-1-11. Burial E x p e n s e s .
P u r s u a n t to Section 34A-2-418 if death results from
an industrial injury or occupational disease, burial
expenses in ordinary cases shall be paid by the employer or insurance carrier up to $4,000. Unusual
cases may result in additional payment, either voluntarily by the employer or insurance carrier or through
commission order.
References: 34A-2-101 et seq., 34A-3-101 et seq.,
34A-1-104 et seq., 63-46b-l et seq.
History: 10879, AMD, 08/01/90; 10918, NSC,
07/10/90; 10951, NSC, 07/25/90; 11470, AMD,
02/01/91; 13351, AMD, 10/15/92; 13517, AMD,
12/01/92; 13518, AMD, 12/01/92; 14635, AMD,
08/31/93; 15488, NSC, 03/01/94; 15490, NSC,
03/01/94; 17089, AMD, 08/31/95; 17524, NSC,
01/22/96; 17937, AMD, 10/01/96; 18179, AMD,
12/03/96; 19326, NSC, 07/01/97; 20060, AMD,
12/02/97; 20260, 5YR, 11/24/97; 21470, NSC, 10/22/98;
22452, AMD, 12/02/99; 22453, AMD, 12/02/99; 23223,

AMD. see CPR, 23223, CPR, 03/20/2001; 23462, NSC.
02/15/2001; 24016, AMD, 10/16/2001; 24275, NSC,
01/01/2002; 24276, NSC, 01/0172002.
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ANALYSIS

Applicable law.
Conflicting evidence.
Medical panel.
—Role.
—When to convene.
Cited.
Applicable law.
Rule requiring claimant's industrial accident be a
"significant" cause of disability when worker had
already qualified for Social Security benefits and
which was promulgated after worker's industrial accident, but before worker's application for a hearing
before the Industrial Commission, could not be applied retroactively. The general rule in workers' compensation cases is that the court is to apply the law
existing at the time of injury. (Former R490-1-17.)
Abel v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 R2d 367 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
Conflicting e v i d e n c e .
In light of the conflict in three medical reports,
claimant could not be deprived of the benefit of medical panel review by administrative law judge's decision to disregard two of the reports because their
authors did not provide supporting information that
they were not requested to provide. Willardson v.
Industrial Comm'n, 904 R2d 671 (Utah 1995).
Medical panel.
—Role.
Although the medical panel is responsible for making findings regarding disputed medical aspects of a
compensation claim, its role is limited. The medical
panel may not act as a factfinder in the same way the
administrative law judge finds facts, nor may the
panel base its conclusions on the assumption of facts
not in evidence, and the medical panel may not, except
in limited circumstances, assess the credibility of the
claimant's testimony. However, a medical panel acted
within its authority in considering all evidence pertaining to the injury-causing incident and forming a
medical conclusion based on that evidence. (Former
R490-1-1.) Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board
of Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
—When to convene.
Although § 35-1-77 (renumbered as § 34A-2-601)
explicitly grants discretion to the Industrial Commission as to whether to convene a medical panel, the
Commission restricted its own discretion by promulgating rules requiring it to convene a medical panel in
certain instances. However, because the Commission
found no specific or supported impairment rating in
the record, much less conflicting impairment ratings,
there was no departure from the agency's rule because
the agency's rules did not apply. (R568-1-9.) Ashcroft v.
Industrial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App.)
D i s t i n g u i s h e d , 860 P2d 960, cert, denied,.
Industrial Commission, in determining that there
wras no credible evidence of medical causation, ran
afoul of UAC R-568-1-9 which requires the appointment of a medical panel to determine medical causa-
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DANIEL HONE,
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Petitioner,
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER
Judge Debbie L. Hann

GENEVA ROCK and/or ROYAL &,
SUN ALLIANCE,
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*

The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before Debbie L. Hann,
Administrative Law Judge, Utah Labor Commission, on June 12, 2001 in St. George Utah.
The petitioner was present in represented by Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law. The
respondents were reoresented by Brad Betebenner, Attorney at Law. The hearing record
was subsequently closed on July 31, 2001.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioner filed an application for hearing on November 9, 2000 alleging
entitlement to permanent total disability compensation benefits as a result of an August 29,
1995 injury. The respondent filed an answer on December 14, 2000, denying liability for
the claimed benefits due to lack of legal and medical causation. The respondent also
alleges the petitioner is not entitled to benefits due to pre-existing conditions; that the
petitioner had sustained injuries prior to or subsequent to the injury for which the
respondents are not responsible; and, that the respondent is entitled to apportionment of
causal responsibility for medical treatment and benefits if responsibility for such is found.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties stipulated the petitioners' compensation rate for this claim is the
maximum rate of $365.00 per week.

2.

In August 1995, the petitioner was employed as a dry rock crusher operator for the
respondent. On August 29,1995, the petitioner arrived at work at 3:00 a.m. and at
4:00 a.m. began, along with 3 or 4 other employees, to take apart the rock crusher
to remove and change the screens. This is usually done once or twice a month and
usually takes one full shift to complete. The petitioner had to crawl in small areas
of the crusher where there was only approximately 30" clearance. He also had to
unbolt the screens while lying down in an awkward position. The screens weighed
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between 80 and 100 pounds. The petitioner also had to push and pull while in
awkward positions.
3.

The petitioner worked until approximately 8 a.m. when he took a twenty minute
break inside a trailer. At this point, all the old screens had been removed from
inside the crusher. After the break, the petitioner went back into the yard to begin
loading metal strips, approximately 8' long and 2%" thick and weighing about 20
pounds. There were three metal strips, lying slightly up off the ground on pieces of
wood, in an open area in the yard. The petitioner characterized them as "easy to
pick up" and "very light." The petitioner was picking up strips one at a time with both
hands and throwing them into the scoop of a front end loader which was
approximately 2-3 feet off the ground. The petitioner was standing in an area
between the strips and loader. He bent over, turning with both his feet and torso to
pick up the strips and stood up and turned again with his feet and torso while
throwing the stip into the front end loader, a distance of 6 to 10 feet. The petitioner
characterized lifting the strips as "not that awkward" because they were worn down
so they were "light and easy to lift." The petitioner was using "good posture" in
lifting and was not off-balance but he was both twisting his torso and moving his feet
as he was working.

4.

As the petitioner was turning back from throwing the second strip into the front
loader to pick up the third strip, he felt a sharp sudden pain in his back, similar to
the pain of a kidney stone, which is what the petitioner thought he had at the time.
The petitioner finished his shift but was in pain that evening although he still
believed he had a kidney stone so was drinking water and lying down.

5.

He reported to work the next morning but was in too much pain to continue working
and at noon that day he reported to the general foreman that he had been hurt, was
in great pain and need to go home.

6.

The petitioner sought treatment with Dr. John W. Nelson on August 30, 1995. An
MRI was done at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on August 31, 1995, at Dr.
Nelson's request, and compared to the petitioner's June 13,1995 MRI. The August
MRI noted significant bulging of the L2-3 disc space impinging the left side of thecal
sac and extending toward the left neural foramina and stenosis due to narrowing of
AP diameter. It also noted L3-4 slight disc bulge and narrowing of the AP diameter.
The impression was status-post L4-5 S1 fusion to degenerative disc disease with
desiccations of the L2-3, L3-4 discs. Medical exhibit 561.

7.

On December 4,1995, Dr. Howard Reichman performed a re-exploration of lumbar
fusion, take-down of the fusion at the upper part of L4, laminectomy, L2-2,
diskectomy orfthe left side at L2-3 and wide nerve root decompression and tied into
the prior fusion. Both the pre- operative and postoperative diagnosis was failed
back syndrome with spinal stenosis at L2-3, L3-4 and disk herniation on the left side
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at L 2-3. Medical exhibit 572-576.
8.

The petitioner has a history of lower back pain and prior back surgery. In 1976, the
petitioner suffered a work-related injury while working in a construction shop where
he lifted a 55 gallon drum of oil weighing in excess of 300 potr Is. In December
1976, the petitioner underwent a debridement and fusion L:-4 to the sacrum.
Medical exhibits 3. The petitioner was awarded a 15% whole person permanent
partial disability rating as a result of the three levels fusion involving two disks
spaces when he was approximately 28 years old. Medical exhibit 8.

9.

The petitioner sought medical treatment on November 29,1993 due to an industrial
injury from lifting aluminum at Cressona Aluminum. The diagnosis at that time was
radicular pain from the petitioner's lower back to his right thigh. Medical exhibit 688.

10.

Petitioner sought medical treatment in spring 1995 because he started to feel
"heavy" with some pain in his back. On April 19,1995, the petitioner complained of
persistent back discomfort and radicular pain symptoms down his left lower
extremity to Dr. Wesley Wiley. Medical exhibit 26. On June 6,1995, the petitioner
saw Dr. Reichman on referral from Dr. Wiley to assess his back pain. Dr. Reichman
notes in his history that after the first fusion in 1977, the severe pain went away
leaving only some residual back pain and the petitioner was able to "go back to
weight lifting, jogging, and work" but now the pain is much more severe and fairly
continuous. Dr. Reichman notes the petitioner's pain began to be troublesome as
the petitioner's left knee has worn out and Dr. Reichman was unsure if was due to
his back wearing out that caused the knee problems or whether the worn knee
altered the petitioner's back mechanics. At this point, the petitioner had pain
radiating down both legs. Of note was the petitioner was not going a day without
pain and that taking Lortab, Darvocet and Robaxin did not alleviate the pain. Dr
Reichman's impression was progressive symptoms suggesting S1 problems.
Medical exhibit 62-63.

11.

The petitioner began having another employee help him to avoid any heavy lifting
at work ttie summer of 1995. The petitioner was hoping to move into lighter duty
due to his back pain.

12.

On August 10,1995, Dr. Reichman reviewed diagnostic testing and determined the
petitioner had mild bulging disks with desiccation of the discs at L 2-3 and L 3-4,
above the level of the fusion. Dr. Reichman recommended pain control through the
pain clinic rather than fusion of the complete lumbar spine. Medical exhibit 65.

13.

On September 21, 1995, petitioner was able to follow up with Dr. Reichman
following his injury on August 29,1995. Dr. Reichman noted some weakness of hip
flexion on the left side compared to the right but was unsure whether it was
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weakness or pain and noted it was asymmetrical compared to the right side.
Otherwise, the petitioner's exam was not "much different from when I saw him
before." Dr. Reichman reviewed the MRI and noted that the petitioner has a 3 level
fusion and "he has worn out disk at L2-3. L 3-4 does not look very healthy either.
. . " Medical exhibit 66. On October 5, 1995, Dr. Reichman noted that it if surgery
is performed it would leave the petitioner "terribly stiff and unable to ever do any
heavy labor" and on October 24,1995, opined that the petitioner was "worn out at
L2-3 and he has a large far lateral herniation. He is also quite degenerated at L 3-4
and he has the old fusion from L-4 to S1." Medical exhibit 67-68.
14.

On March 13, 1997, Dr. Max Root found petitioner to be medically stable
following his second fusion and discectomy performed December 4, 1995.
Dr. Root give the petitioner a 12% whole person impairment rating, using the
A. M A guides, for the December 4, 1995 surgery. Medical record 103.

15.

The petitioner also had degenerative changes in his left knee which ultimately lead
to knee replacement surgery. In 1965, the petitioner injured his left knee playing
sports and had surgery in 1966 to repair a split patellar tendon. By the mid-1980's,
the petitioner's current left knee problems began when "something popped" and in
the late the 1980's and early 1990's, the petitioner had three to five scope
procedures. In 1996 she had a total knee replacement. In the 1980's, the petitioner
had a surgical procedure to restate the ligaments in his right ankle. The petitioner
also has Bell's Palsy, originally diagnosed in 1969 and recurring in 1979 on the
other side of his face. The petitioner has sleep apnea and used oxygen at night
only for about two years and began using oxygen full time about two months prior
to the hearing. The petitioner injured his right hand in 1980 and had to have pin
inserted to repair the broken bone. He has no problems with it other than
discomfort when there is a low pressure weather system. The petitioner also
suffered a compression fracture at T12 when involved in an automobile accident in
1969. He does not have recurrent pain as a result but does "get tired there."

16.

The petitioner also had problems with chronic pain. In 1980, the petitioner was in
a detoxification program at the U of U. On July 30, 1982, the petitioner was
admitted to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for chronic back pain and possible
drug addiction. Dr. John C. Woods noted the petitioner had a "very unusual
response to both narcotics, and analgesics and probably corticosteroids in small
amounts." Medical exhibit 548-554. The petitioner took pain medication regularly
for both back and knee pain and after the 1996 knee surgery, Dr. Nelson referred
the petitioner to Dr. Rosenthal at a pain clinic. In June 1996 the petitioner also
entered a drug rehabilitation program at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on
referral from Dr. Wylie as a result of abusing Lorcet. Medical exhibit 592.

17.

In April 1998, the petitioner began treatment with Dr. Bradley Root for pain
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medication and pain control due to chronic low back pain. During his treatment, Dr.
Root referred the petitioner to Dr. E. Alan Jeppsen (medical exhibit 493), Dr. James
Barnett (medical exhibit 499) and Dr. Raymond J. Middleton (medical exhibit 504).
As of January 10, 2001, the petitioner had seen in improvement since a Botox
injection and continuing physical therapy. The petitioner was taking Oxycontin,
Doxepin, Baclofen, Vioxx and Prilosec at that time. Medical exhibit 223-377.
18.

On May 21, 2001, the petitioner reported to Dr. Richard T. Knoebel for an
independent medical evaluation who diagnosed chronic low back pain without
radiculopathy status post two fusions, psychological factors affecting physical
condition, chronic narcotic habituation and current pulmonary problems. Dr.
Knoebel does not believe the petitioners current condition was caused by an
industrial incident. He noted the petitioner was seen by Dr. Reichman two weeks
prior to the industrial incident and at that time was having chronic back problems.
He also noted the June 13, 1995 CT mylogram showed bulging disks at L2-3 and
L 3-4 similar to what was seen on the MRI done after the injury. Dr. Knoebel notes
that the mechanism of the injury was minor as petitioner was only picking up a light
piece of metal. As a result, it is Dr. Knoebel's opinion the August 1995 injury was
not the cause of the petitioners current medical condition. Medical exhibit 534-543.

19.

The petitioner's physical condition has been declining since 1997. On February 6,
1997, Dell Felix, P.T. performed the first of 2 functional capacity evaluations. At that
time, th petitioner said he could sit for 2-3 hours but could not stand straight or for
longer than 10-15 minutes at one time. The petitioner could not walk on a treadmill
for more than 7 minutes but could go up and down stairs. The petitioner had
functional range of motion with the exception of limitations on stooping and
kneeling. The petitioner had excellent grip strength and could lift 55 pounds and
carry the weight 25 feet. Mr. Felix's opinion was the petitioner's ability was in the
medium physical demand characteristic of work based on hand function and
lift/carry ability although he was limited in his work ability due to the need to
alternate sitting and standing with significant limits on standing. Medical exhibit
134-136. By the time of the second evaluation on May 21-22, 2001, the petitioner
did not meet the sedentary physical demand work level. Medical exhibit 137-141.

20.

Currently, the petitioner has pain down his buttocks and legs and has to alternate
standing and lying down. The petitioner has difficulty sitting. The petitioner has to
lean on something while standing because his back cannot support him. The
petitioner can lift a maximum of the about 6 pounds. Petitioner can bend over if
leaning on something and also can kneel. He can climb one to two rungs on a
ladder. Lying down is the most comfortable position and he does this frequently to
minimize pain.

21.

The petitioner does little around the house and spends most of his day reading and
watching television. The petitioner is able to drive in the morning when his pain
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level is lower. When he drives for longer than a short errand, he has to stop
frequently so that he can stand and walk around.
22.

The petitioner is not presently employed. His last job was in 1995 when he tried
substitute teaching but was unsuccessful due to his inability to sit or stand for any
sustained time. The petitioner has had no other work for wages since 1995. The
petitioner receives Social Security disability benefits. The petitioner does some
volunteer work for his church.

23.

After the petitioner's injury in 1976, he worked construction from 1977 through 1985
when he got a real estate license and worked for a short time selling real estate.
From January 1986 through 1988, the petitioner work for a mining company in the
front office and did some parts running. From 1988 through 1991, the petitioner
worked as an accounts manager. For a few months in late 1991 and early 1992,
the petitioner worked in sales. For approximately one-and-a-half years after that,
the petitioner helped to organize and manage a meat plant in Springville, Utah. The
petitioner then returned to work in manufacturing and construction. The petitioner
began working for the respondent about 1 !4 years prior to the August 1995 injury.

24.

The claim was submitted in September 1995 and the respondent paid temporary
total disability benefits, permit partial disability benefits and medical expenses.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
R612-1-10 of the Utah Administrative Code outlines the process for adjudicating
cases of permanent total disability and states in relevant part:
A. This rule applies to claims for permanent total disability compensation under the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
1. Subsection B applies to permanent total disability claims arising from
accident or disease prior to May 1, 1995.
2. Subsection C applies to permanent total disability claims arising from
accident or disease on or after May 1,1995.

C. For permanent total disability claims arising on or after May 1, 1995, Section
34A-2-413 requires a two-step adjudicative process. First, the Commission must make a
preliminary determination whether the applicant is permanently and totally disabled. If so,
the Commission will proceed to the second step, in which the Commission will determine
whether the applicant can be reemployed or rehabilitated.
1. First Step- Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total Disability: On
receipt of an application for permanent total disability compensation, the
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Adjudication Division will assign an Administrative Law Judge to conduct
evidentiary proceedings to determine whether the applicant's circumstances
meet each of the elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2-413(1 )(b) and (c).
(a) If the ALJ finds the applicant meets each of the elements
set forth in Subsections 34A-2-413(1 )(b) and (c), the ALJ will
issue a preliminary determination of permanent total
disability and shall order the employer or insurance carrier to
pay permanent total disability compensation to the applicant
pending completion of the second step of the adjudication
process. The payment of permanent total disability
compensation pursuant to a preliminary determination shall
commence as of the date established by the preliminary
determination and shall continue until otherwise ordered.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 states in relevant part:
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of
impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease
that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(Hi) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of
the employee's permanent total disability.
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude
that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit
the employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupational^ caused impairment or combination of
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions
of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for
the employee's permanent total disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking
into consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience,
medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.
Olsen v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 776 P.2d 937 (Utah App. 1989), aff'd 797 P.2d
1098 (Utah 1990), held that where a case has not been adjudicated by the Industrial (now
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Labor) Commission, an insurer's initial acceptance of a worker's compensation claim and
payment of benefits does not estop an insurer from raising defenses to liability on
subsequent benefit claims. A petitioner must show a change in position or relinquishment
of rights as a result of receiving a temporary total disability, permit partial disability and/or
medical benefits to estop an insurer from raising defenses to liability for subsequent claims
for additional benefits.
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15,18 (Utah 1986), the Court held the
statute [current section 34A-2-401] "...creates two prerequisites for a finding of a
compensable injury. First, the injury must be 'by accident.' Second, the language 'arising
out of or in the course of employment' requires that there be a causal connection between
the injury and the employment." Further, a petitioner for workers compensation benefits
with a preexisting condition must show that his employment contributed something
substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his condition.
This additional element of risk in the workplace is supplied by an exertion greater than that
undertaken in typical non-employment activity. "The causation requirement makes it
necessary to distinguish those injuries which (a) coincidentally occur at work because a
preexisting condition results in symptoms which appear during work hours without any
enhancement from the workplace and (b) those injuries which occur because some
condition or exertion required by the employment increases the risk of injury which the
worker normally faces in everyday life." Id. at 25.
For an injury to be compensable under the Act, a petitioner must show by evidence,
opinion or otherwise that the stress, strain or exertion required by his or her occupation led
to the resulting injury or disability and in the event a petitioner cannot show a medical
causal connection, compensation should be denied. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Although the respondent accepted and paid temporary total disability, permanent
partial disability and medical benefits in 1995 after the petitioner's injury, because the
Commission never adjudicated this claim, the respondent may raise defenses to liability on
future claims for benefits unless the petitioner can show a change in position or
relinquishment of any rights as a result of previously receiving these benefits. The
petitioner presented no evidence of either a relinquishment of a right or change of position
as a result of previously receiving benefits thus, the respondent may raise defenses to
liability for the petitioner's claim of permanent total disability benefits.
The petitioner suffers from a pre-existing industrial back injury with another
employer which resulted in a lumbar fusion. Immediately prior to this injury, the petitioner
was actively seeking treatment for pain in his back and on August 10,1995, Dr. Reichman
reviewed a myelogram and plain films which revealed mild bulging discs with deussation
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at L2-3 and L3-4, above the level of the fusion. Therefore, the petitioner must meet the
heightened legal standard set forth in Allen with a showing of an unusual or extraordinary
exertion. To determine whether a particular work activity meets the higher Allen test, a
comparison must be made between the work activity and other typical activities and
exertions experienced by men and women in modern nonemployment life.
The event causing the petitioner's injury was a bending, twisting motion while lifting
a long piece of metal weighing about 20 pounds. By the petitioner's own admission, it was
light and easy to lift and his was not in an awkward position, using good posture given his
prior lumbar fusion. Such exertion is not atypical of late twentieth century non-industrial life.
The weight lifted is well under 50 pounds and is no more than picking up a small child, lifting
a tire or carrying a garbage can to the street, three examples set forth by the Court in Allen.
The activity described is similar to yard work in picking up a tree limbs and tossing them into
the back of truck for removal or picking up and carrying 8'x2" wood or composite for home
improvement/repair projects which are activities common to non-industrial life. Therefore,
the petitioner's work activity at the time of her accident does not meet the Allen test for
legal causation.
Following the August 29, 1995 injury, the petitioner's treating physician, Dr.
Reichman, saw little in the way of difference between the petitioner's back condition before
and after the injury. There is no medical evidence or opinion supporting a finding the
petitioner's August 29, 1995 injury was the medical cause of his current back condition.
The petitioner had a long history of back pain following his 1976 injury and lumbar fusion
surgery. A possible contribution to increased pain was the degeneration of the petitioner's
left knee as a result of sports related injuries. Dr. Knoebel's opinion is that the petitioner's
current condition is not the result of the August 29, 1995 incident based upon Dr.
Reichman's records and review of the MRIs as well as the relatively minor incident which
caused the injury. There is no medical evidence of record which suggests otherwise.
Although the petitioner has been unable to return to work, there is no medical evidence
which suggests it was medically caused by this event therefore the petitioner has also failed
to establish that this injury is the medical cause of his current condition.
Consequently, the petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence
that his current back problems arise out of and in the course of his employment with the
respondent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The respondent is not liable for permanent total compensation benefits.

ORDER
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore, it is
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DANIEL HONE,
Applicant,

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

v.
GENEVA ROCK PRODUCTS and
ROYAL & SUN ALLIANCE,

*

Case No. 00-1061

Defendants.

Daniel Hone asks the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's
denial of Mr. Hone's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 34A,
Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated, and the Utah Occupational Disease Act, Title 34A, Chapter 3,
Utah Code Annotated.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
Mr. Hone seeks workers' compensation benefits for a back injury allegedly related to a work
accident at Geneva Rock Products ("Geneva") on August 29, 1995. The ALJ denied Mr. Hone's
claim on the grounds his injury did arise out of his employment at Geneva, in that such employment
was neither the legal nor the medical cause of his back injury.
Mr. Hone now asks the Commission to review the ALJ's decision. First, Mr. Hone contends
that Geneva's previous payment of workers' compensation benefits to Mr. Hone for the injuries now
in question estops Geneva from now denying liability.1 Regarding the issue of legal causation, Mr.
Hone contends the two-pronged test for legal causation established in Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), has either been overruled by statute or is unconstitutional.
Alternatively, Mr. Hone argues that, if the Allen test for legal causation remain in effect, it is the less
stringent prong of that test which applies to his claim, but that the facts of his claim are sufficient
to satisfy even the more stringent prong of the test. Finally, Mr. Hone contends the ALJ's decision
is factually and legally inadequate and does not address whether Mr. Hone's medical problems are
compensable as an occupational disease.

The Commission has rearranged the various issues raised by Mr. Hone so they can be
considered in a logical order.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the ALJ's decision, which can be
summarized as follows.
In 1976, while working for an employer other than Geneva, Mr. Hone suffered a serious
injury and underwent fusion surgery in his lower spine, resulting in a 15% whole person impairment.
In 1993, again working for an employer other than Geneva, Mr. Hone began experiencing pain in
his lower back and right thigh. Thereafter, Mr. Hone began work at Geneva. He sought medical
treatment for back problems during the spring and summer of 1995. He was diagnosed with mild
bulging disks and desiccation of discs at the L 2-3 and L3-4 levels of his spine. By the summer of
1995, Mr. Hone was receiving help from a co-worker for heavy lifting at work.
Mr. Hone's current claim for benefits is based on an incident that occurred while working
at Geneva on August 29, 1995. Mr. Hone had spent that morning removing screens from a rock
crusher. This task was performed in a narrow space and required lifting, pulling and twisting, but
Mr. Hone had no unusual difficulty or pain in performing these activities. He then took a 20 minute
break. When he resumed work, he began picking up metal strips from the ground and throwing them
approximately 10 feet into the bucket of a front end loader. Each strip was 8 feet long and 214 inches
wide and weighed about 20 lbs. As Mr. Hone threw the second strip into the loader, he experienced
sharp, sudden pain in his back. He was able to complete his work shift that day, but was in constant
pain.
The following day, Mr. Hone continued to experience back pain and was unable to work.
He sought medical attention and was diagnosed with significant bulging at the L3-4 level of the spine
and degenerative disc disease of the L2-3 and L3-4 discs. In December, 1995, Mr. Hone underwent
additional surgery at the L2-3 and L3-4 levels of the spine. Since then, he has continued to suffer
from low back problems. It is the opinion of the physicians who have examined and treated Mr.
Hone that his current medical problems were not caused by the August 29, 1995, work incident at
Geneva.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The Commission addresses each of the issues raised by Mr. Hone's motion for review as
follows.
Estoppel: Mr. Hone contends the fact that Geneva previously paid workers' compensation
benefits in this matter should estop Geneva from now denying liability. However, as noted by the
Utah Court of Appeals in Olsen v Industrial Commission, 776 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah App. 1989), an
employer or insurance company that initially pays benefits is not estopped from later denying
liability unless the claimant demonstrates he or she has changed position or relinquished some right
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as a result of the such payments. The Court of Appeals also observed in Olsen that imposing
estoppel against employers and insurance carriers that initially paid benefits voluntarih' "would
encourage employers and insurance carriers to contest all employment related injuries to avoid later
being estopped from raising their claims."
The Court of Appeals' decision in Olsen governs the circumstances of Mr. Hone's claim.
The Commission agrees with the ALJ that Mr. Hone has not established that he was prejudiced by
Geneva's initial payment of benefits. The Commission therefore concludes that Geneva is not
estopped from denying liability for Mr. Hone's current claim for additional benefits.
Legal causation: The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to workers injured
by accident "arising out of and in the course o f employment. See §34A-2-401 of the Act. The Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. Industrial Commission 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), establishes
the principle that an injury tharises out of employment" if tl mployment is both the "legal cause"
and the "medical cause" of the injury. Furthermore, the Anen decision establishes a two-pronged
test for legal causation.
Mr. Hone contends the two-pronged Allen test for legal causation is no longer applicable
because (1) the underlying statute under which Allen was decided has been amended, and (2) the
Allen decision violates the equal protection clauses of the Utah and United States constitutions.
With respect to Mr. Hone's constitutional argument, the Commission's adjudicative authority does
not extend to questions of constitutionality. Consequently, the Commission lacks authority to
consider that argument. As to Mr. Hone's argument that the Allen test for legal causation has been
discarded as a result of statutory changes, the Commission notes that despite such statutory changes,
Utah's appellate courts continue to cite and apply Allen. The Commission concludes the Allen test
for legal causation remains in force and is applicable to Mr. Hone's claim.
The Commission now turns to the application of the Allen test for legal causation to Mr.
Hone'sclaim. In Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission. 731 P.2d 1079,1082 (Utah 1986),
the court discussed the Allen tests as follows:
Under Allen, a usual or ordinary exertion, so long as it is an activity connected with
the employee's duties, will suffice to show legal cause. However, if the claimant
suffers from a pre-existing condition, then he or she must show that the employment
activity involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the "usual
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." . . . . The requirement of
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" is designed to screen out those injuries that result
from a personal condition which the worker brings to the job, rather than from
exertions required of the employee in the workplace. (Citations omitted.)-
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Thus, the Allen test of legal causation consists of two alternative prongs. The less stringent
prong applies if the worker has no preexisting condition that contributes to the injury for which he
or she seeks workers' compensation benefits. The second, more stringent, prong applies where such
a preexisting condition does exist.
The ALJ and Commission have both determined that Mr. Hone suffered from pre-existing
spinal conditions that contributed to the injuries for which he now seeks benefits. In fact, he was
actively seeking medical care for such conditions immediately prior to the date on which he claims
to have injured himself at work. Consequently, Mr. Hone is eligible for workers' compensation
benefits only if he can satisfy the more stringent prong of the Allen test for legal causation. To do
so, he must establish that the employment activity on which his claim is based involved work
exertions which were over and above the "usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life.
In applying the foregoing standard to Mr. Hone's claim, it is necessary to identify the actual
work activity that gives rise to Mr. Hone's claim. Mr. Hone argues that his work activities included
the lifting, pulling and twisting he had engaged in during the morning of August 29,1995. However,
as noted by the ALJ, Mr. Hone completed such activities with no problems and then took a rest
break. It was only after he had commenced the entirely different work activity of picking up metal
strips and throwing them into the bucket of a front-end loader that he felt the acute back pain which
ultimately resulted in his current claim. Under these circumstances, it is Mr. Hone's activity of
picking up metal strips, not his earlier activity of removing screens from the rock crusher, that must
satisfy the more stringent prong of the Allen test for legal causation.
The ALJ has accurately and thoroughly described the exertions involved as Mr. Hone picked
up the metal strips and threw them into the front end loader. The metal strips weighed 20 lbs and
was not of an unusual or awkward size. Mr. Hone was not required to use any strained posture or
position in order to perform the task. Nor was the task repetitive, inasmuch as Mr. Hone experienced
his back pain in the course of picking up only the second metal strip. On balance, the exertion
described by Mr. Hone in this matter is less strenuous than a wide range of common modern
nonemployment exertions, such as lifting and carrying personal luggage, taking out the trash, lifting
a small child or changing an automobile tire. The Commission therefore concludes, as did the ALJ
that Mr. Hone has failed to establish legal causation. Consequently, the injuries in question did not
arise out of his employment at Geneva and are not compensable under the Act.2

The ALJ also concluded Mr. Hone failed to establish that his work at Geneva was the
medical cause of his injuries. Mr. Hone has not challenged the ALJ's determination on this
point. Consequently, regardless of the Commission's decision on the issue of legal
causation, Mr. Hone's claim must fail for lack of medical causation.
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Mr. Hone's claim as an occupational disease: Finally, Mr. Hone contends that even if his
current claim is not compensable under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. it should also be
evaluated for compensability under the Utah Occupational Disease Act. Admittedly, there can be
some overlap in the reach of the two Acts. Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that
a claim may be classified as an occupational disease claim if the underlying medical complaint is a
"gradually developing condition." Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986),
citing Carling v. Industrial Commission, 399 P.2d 202 (Utah 1965). In this case, the injury for which
Mr. Hone claims benefits was characterized by Mr. Hone himself as sudden, discrete event3 and was
properly evaluated under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
In summary, the Commission finds no merit to the various arguments raised in Mr. Hone's
motion for review. The Commission acknowledges that the Worker's Compensation Act must be
construed liberally in favor of compensation to injured workers. Nevertheless, applicants for
workers" compensation benefits must meet the Act's standards for compensability. The Commission
agrees with the ALJ that Mr. Hone had not met those standards.
ORDER
The Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Mr. Hone's motion for review.
It is so ordered.
Dated this ^ d a y of February, 2002.

r
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^

R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days
of the date of this order.

For example, Mr. Hone's Application For Hearing states as follows: "Applicat (sic) picked
up a heavy piece of metal to place in cat load bucket and twisted and strained back."
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